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Summary
This paper describes the mortgage banking function and the risk-return
perspective of the decision maker. The decision environment is expressed in
a straightforward, though quite extensive, dynamic programing model. While
solution of the complete model involving three-part state characterization
and multiple sources of uncertainty is beyond current technology, a reduced
version which replaces certain decision points with policy constraints is
presented and tested. The reduced model is shown to be a workable management
tool, while the complete model can serve as a basis for further research.
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Th e Problem
The clearest presentation l f the mortgage placement problem is through the
mortgage banking firm (MBF) which is a n?n-depository financial intermediary
whose principal activity is the origination and servicing of mortgage loans.
The firm operates by caking loan applications, committing funds to borrowers,
closing the loans with finds normally borrowed through bank lines of credit
and finally selling a package of loans to a permanent investor. Through
this sequence of activities, the MFB seeks to maximize the discounted
present value of a series of cash flows.
The cash flows derive from five distinct mortgage banking functions:
(1) loan origination, (2) warehousing, (3) float, (4) servicing, and (5)
marketing. Cash flows from loan origination are usually negative and equal
the difference between the origination fee charged the borrower and the
origination costs (mainly personnel time) incurred by the MBF . Loans held in the
MBF's portfolio provide warehousing cash flows. The value of these cash flows
depends on the interest rate differential between the long term rates received
on the loans and the short term rate paid on the firm's commercial bank line of
credxt. Warehousing cash flows are usually positive when the yield curve slopes
upward and are normally negative when the yield curve is downward-sloping.
Float cash flows are always positive and represent the time value of money in-
volved in holding interm payments by borrowers (principal, incerest, insurance
and taxes) prior to remittance to final lenders, insurance companies, and the
government. The fee charged for "handling loan collections" for the final lender,
less the cost of such operations, constitutes the servicing cash flow and is
usuallv positive. The marketing cash flows are the gain or loss on the resale of
mortgages to final lenders.
Unlike savings and loans, commercial banks and other mortgage lenders, the
MBF has no deposits and no significant sources of revenue beyond mortgage banking.
Consequently the Mr,F is the purest case of the entrepreneur in the field and
offers a clear basis for the presentation of the mortgage loan placement decision.
When incorporated with ether balance sheec considerations, the :iodel developed
in this paper is also appropriate for other mortgage lenders.
Historically, the MBF has sought to maximize loan production, thereby
maximizing servicing revenue (which is the key profit item) . The firm
operates subject to two constraining factors: (1) limited credit lines
and (2) fluctuating interest rate:;.
The first factor implies that loans must be continually "rolled over" to
permit additional originations which will generate increased servicing revenue.
Thus loans must be not only originated, but alio sold. The MBF can sell either
from inventory or, more frequently, by first securing purchase commitments from
permanent lenders and then delivering loans to the permanent lenders against
these commitments. Commitments have a limited life and can call for either
mandatory or optional delivery by the MBF of some stated quantity of loans
at a price that will provide the permanent investor with the yield specified
in the commitment contract.
The size of the mortgage loan inventory which can be held at any point
in time is a function of the MBF's equity and its line of credit (typically
at a commercial bank) . The amount that commercial banks will lend to a MBF
is a function of the riskiness of the firm, primairly whether it has "good"
purchase commitments for the vast majority of the loans in its portfolio.
Since commitments are "good" or "bad" depending on market interest rates,
fluctuating interest rates consequently necessitate continual commitment
coverage adjustment. Adverse changes in interest- rates render some of the
MBF commitments virtually worchless by making delivery possible only at
a substantial marketing loss. Hence, to maintain the necessary coverage,
the firm must purchase additional commitments as old ones expire or are
exercised, as the firm originates new loans, and as changes in interest
rates reduce the value of its existing commitments.
Clearly, the decision environment of the MBF is more complex than
simply "maximizing loan production." The firm must repeatedly make three
interrelated, yet distinct, decisions in a world filled with uncertainty. •
First, Che firm must choose what, volume of loans to originate. Second
the level of commitment coverage and the partitioning of the coverage
among the placement alternatives must be determined. Finally, delivery
decisions must be made (i.e., the MBF must choose which commitments
to exercise and which loans to deliver) thereby creating the marketing gain
or loss.
The decisions depend on not only the MBF's current portfolio (loans
as well as commitments), but also its expectations for future interest rates
and mortgage demand. Moreover, the typical firm perfers covered originations,
and, consequently, reduced exposure to interest rate fluctuations. Such
a policy, however, requires the firm to purchase commitments without knowing
the interest rate on its future originations. Furthermore, since some com-
mitments are acquired through competitive sealed-bid auctions, the MBF
cannot ilways be assured of obtaining all the commitments it seeks. Thus,
even when originaring loans against previously obtained commitments, there
are two sources of uncertainty— the market determined rate on new origination^
and the outcome of the commitment auction. In addition, the firm must
administer its origination and delivery decisions without violating its
credit line agreement. Finally, the commitment decisions themselves must
also be monitored to avoid excessive interest rate risk.
J
"The alternatives include the FNMA (standby convertibles and, more impor-
tantly, biweekly free market system auctions for both government insured and
conventional loans in both competitive and noncompetitive modes), GN'MA
(negotiated commitments), FHLMC (weekly auction), privately guaranteed
mortgage pass-throughs (major institutions only) , and traditional private
placements. For a fuller discussion and bibliography, see Sears, R. Stephen,
"A Market Placement Model for the Mortgage 3anker," Ph.D. dissertation,
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1979.
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Note that even optional commitments cc not eliminate all risk. If
interest races fall, the firm can deliver and solve the volume problem bat
suffer a marketing loss. Alternatively , the firm can choose not co deliver
and avoid the interest rate risk 'the markecir.c loss), but in the process
lose the solution to the volume problem.
Since the firm must make today's decisions in light of its expectations
concerning the future, the entire process is dynamic. Decisions are not
made in isolation, but as part of an on-going sequential decision process.
THE COMPLETE MODEL
The Sequence of Events
Every other week, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)
holds a sealed-bid auction where mortgage bankers compete to purchase optional
commitments. .Other commitments can be purchased in negotiated transactions
through the Government National Mortgage Association (.GNMA) or with permanent
4
lenders.
To formulate a dynamic model, let each time period represent two weeks
--the frequency of the FNMA auctions. Within each period, let events occur
in four stages.
First, the firm places its bid(s) in the FNMA auction. The firm must
make its bidding decision without knowing (though with certain expectations
concerning) (a) the results of the FNMA auction, (b) the rates available
this period on all other commitments, (c) the rates at which new loans can
be originated this period, and (d) the rate to be charged by the commercial
bank for this period's financing.
Second, the uncertainties are resolved. The firm learns the results
of the FNMA auctior.--both this period's interest rates on FMNA commitments
and the acceptance or rejection of the firm's bid(s). The interest rates
on other placement alternatives for this period similarly become known.
These are the major placement alternatives. For additional alternatives
and descriptions, see Sears, op . cit.
Finally, new loans arc originated, Che firm's decisions result in a
profit or loss for the period, the company's balance sheet is adjusted appro-
priately, and the system moves to the beginning of a new two-week period
when the MBF must again decide how to bid in the up-coming FNMA auction.
Model Specification
As formulated below, the model requires decision variables, descriptive
variables, and several parameters. The decision variables relate to bidding
in the FNMA auctions, purchasing other commitments, loan delivery against
existing commitments, and closing of new loans. The three latter groups
of decision variables depend on q . Other va.iables, most of which d>-pend
on q , describe now loans, iatorest rates, and balance sheet conditions.
A set of parameters, specifying cost factors and operating constraints,
complete the list of model elements. After an explanation of the superscript
ind subscript notation used, the following sections define these quantities.
In the discussion that follows, frequent use is made of the symbol q .
This variable represents the state of the world after the several uncertainties
are resolved. Specifically, q is the set of information that becomes
available to the MBF in period t after it has bid in the FNMA auction.
LeL Q denote the set of all possible realizations q .
The MBF uses the information set q in deciding what additional com-
mitments to purchase after learnin^ the results of- the FNMA auction and in
making its delivery decisions. In a given period, the realized value of
q determines what commitments, if any, the firm succeeded in buving
th-ough the FNMA auction. From the standpoint of the MBF q also deter-
mines what all the interest rates are for the period and how much demand
for new loans exists in the period.
For all q in Q , let P(q) denote the probability that q occurs.
Of course. P(q)>0, fcr all q , and J n ?(n) = 1.•
' q in Q '
The model assumes that the MBF knows the Hstirbut ion P(q) before
making the bidding decision at the start of each period. That is, the
MBF is assumed to have a good idea about what interest rates will be over
the next two weeks and about what the low bid will be in the upcoming
FNMA action.
w ith the exception of A. (q,.) , OC* (q ) , anc
X.
,
t t 1. t L
DnL , „ (RC
1
,
(q ) , IVv; . (q )) for all i, j, k , I , m, p, c, and t,
j ,k,l,m,p,c,t j,k,m,p p . ,c c
ail of the variables and parameters are constrained to be nonnegative.
Superscript and Subscripts
i = 1,2 Superscript identifying loan classification: i=l refers to
FHA/VA loans; i=2 refers to conventional loans. °
j = 1,2,3 Subscript identifying commitment classification: j=l refers
to FNMA commitments; j=2 refers to mandatory commitments;
j=3 refers to non-FNMA optional commitments.
k = 1,...,K. For j = 1, 2, 3", subscript identifying different commitment
J devices within a given classification. For FNMA commitments
.
K-[_=5, since the firm may enter up to 5 bids in each rericd's
FNMA ACUTION.
£ = 1,...,L' Subscript identifying loan category (property characteristic.-.
etc. )
.
m = 1,...,M Subscript identifying period in which commitments expire.
p = 0,...,t Subscript identifying period in which a commitment was purchased
c = 0,...,t Subscript identifying period in which a loan was closed.
t Subscript identifying the current period.
Dec i s ion Var i a hi "S
'.'
, 1=1,2, k=l,...,5 = face amounts bid in FNMA auctions.
'
u (The firm can enter up to 5 bids of up
to $3 MM each. There are separate auct:;:.3
for government insured and conventional
loans. )
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, i=l,2, k=l,...,5 = interest rates bid in FNMA auctions.
k,t
:J W m t-^r^ i=1 ' 2 ' J =2 ' 3 'j , k , , t t
C.
, (q ), 1 ,2, i , , = face amounts of non-FNMA commitments
k=l,...,K
,
m=t+l,...,M of q# )
= face
via loan delivery.
purchased. (See Footnote 5 for a discussicn
X. (q ) , i=i,2, amounts of commitments exercisedj,k,2.,m,p,c,t n t
J =i >2,3, k=l , . , . ,K .
,
*=!,..., L, n-t... Jm,
p.c-O,... ,t-l
Loans are assumed to be homogeneous with respect to all characteristics
except category, whether FHA/VA or conventional, and interest rate.
V
£ t
(q
t
), 1-1,2, 1=1,.. .,L = face amounts of loans closed.
Descriptive Variables
c
i,k,m,t<V RWk;t>' i=1 - 2 >
k=l,
... ,5, m=t48
= face amounts of FNMA commitments bought
through auction. (All FNMA commitments
have initial 4-month, i.e., 8-period,
maturities.)
^k.-.t'V' i=1 ' 2 ' j=2 ' 3 '
k=l ,K., m=t,
J
.,M
RW
l c
(V' L=1 ' 2 ' 1=1 >---> L
D
ec (q c ), i-1,2, l-l,...,)
= interest rates on non-FNMA commitments.
(The interest rate on FNMA commitments
purchased through accepted bid k is RW L )
k,tw
= interest rate on new loans closed.
= face amount of new loan demand.
A i)t (q t ), 1=1,2, t-l,...,L = after-tax present value coefficient for
servicing revenue to be earned per dollar
face amount of loans closed.
RB
t
(q
t
) = interest rate charged by commercial
bank on firm's borrowing.
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t (q t )
EQ
t
(q
t
)
= face amount of firm's outstanding borrowings.
- iirra s equity position.
,
j,k,£,m,p,c,-- RCj,k,m,p (q p ) ' ^l.c^c^'
= dLscou,,t Posits paid per dollar
1=1,2, j=l,2,3, k-l,...,K
,
1=1,... ,L, m=t, M, p=0,...
,
t-1,
c-0,... ,t-l
face amount of loa is delivered.
FL
£>t <
c
l
t
)' L=1 > 2 > t=l,...,L = after-tax present value coefficient for
float, revenue to be earned per dollar lace
amount of loans closed.
<•" (qJ , i-1,2, 1=1 ,L - average annual float income per dollar
face amount o r loans.
Parameters
CC
„
_(q,.) , L=l , 2 , Jfc=l,...,L = orig Lnat ion cost per dollar face amount
of 1 o a n s closed.'i.t
vV
BC
,
i-1,2, k=l,...,5 = bi.ddi.ng cost fcr dollar face aniou.tc ofk,t
FNMA commitments sought,
CC.
, ,
l = 1
, 2 , j = l,2,3, = co-i-Lxitre.it cost per dollar face araou..t
J
' ' ' k=i,...,K., m=t+l,...,M of commitments purchased.
CC
. ,
. , i = l,2, i = l,2,3, = delivery cost per dollar face amount of
J
' f_i v 9-i t commitments exercised.
tn=t+l,. . . :,M, p=0,...,t-l
CL = the firm's coverage exposure li.nit for
loans
.
BL = the firm's maximum borrowing limit.
EL = the firm's minimum equity limit.
CA = the firm's (fixed) amount of cash.
TX = the firm's marginal tax rate.
a
,
< >a< 1 = one-period discount factor applicable to
after-tax cash flows.
Origination costs depend on q because there may exist discount
points on closing when market interest rates exceed statutory ceilings.
Q
The discount factor, a , is not a function of q because each
period is assumed to be only two weeks long. State-dependent discount
factors should be considered for models with significantly longer periods.
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The State of the Firm
In any period t , the pre-auct ion position of the firm is jointly
defined by its loans (inventory), commitments from permanent lenders, cash,
equity, and bank borrowings. The loan position includes both the amounts
and yields of all loans closed in periods 0, 1, ..., t-1 , remaining on the
balance sheet at the beginning period t . The amounts and rates of all
commitments owned at the beginning of the period constitute the commitment
position. Cash, equity, and bank borrowings are represented by their balance
sheet axounts. Also important are the past values of q .
The iollowing quantities, then, together describe the state of the
firm at the beginning of period t .
t-1 3 K. M t-1 .
CD U* . - V* (q ) - Z Z :.' T. Z X
1
, „
(q )l,n,t-l l,n n
z«„+l j-l k=l m=l p=0 3 »k,£,m,p,n,z z
for i=l,2, 1=1,...,L, and n=0,...,t-l
(2) RV* (q ) for 1-1,2, H=1,...,L, and n=0, . .
.
,t-li,n n
, .
L t-1 t-1
(3) H* , . - C, . (q , RW.
1
) - E Z t 3C , . (q )l,k,m,n,t-l l,k,m,n ^n k,n
^ c=Q 2=n+1 l,k,i,m,n,c,z
M
z
for 1=1,2, k=l,...,5, m=t,...,M, n=0,...,t-i
L t-1 t-1
(4) H. . . . = C
1
, (q ) - Z Z Z X
1
. (q )3,k,m,n,t-l j ,k,m,n ^n
c=Q z=n+1 J ,k,£,m,n,c,z ^z
for 1=1,2, j=2,3, k=l,...,K., 2=1,..., L, m=t,...,M, n=0,...,t-i
j
(5) RC!
,
Cc ) for L=l,2, --1,2,3, k=l , . .
.
,K
. ,
m=t, M, n=0 t-1
] ,K,m, n n ]
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(6) q for n=0,..., t-1
n
(7) CA
(9) ^WVl*
Expressions (1) and (2) describe the firm's loan portfolio at the
beginning of period t (the end of period t-1 ) . The loans of category
i
, type I , closed in period n , remaining in the firm's portfolio at
the beginning of period t , are all those closed in period n , less the
ones that have been delivered to satisfy exercised commitments. Expression
(2) records the interest rates on each type of loan.
Expressions (3), (4), and (5) refer to the company's outstanding
commitments. The commitments presently owned by the firm are all those
it has purchased, minus those that have expired, minus those that have
been exercised. The interest rates on the remaining commitments are recorded
in expression (5)
.
The cash, debt, and equity positions of the firm at the beginning
of period t are given in expressions (7), (8), and (9).
The Objective Function
The assumed goal of the M3F is to maximize the expected dis-
counted present value of the incremental cash flows resulting from
loan closings, corrmltment purchases, and deliv ry decisions.
Recall that the *!BF makes two sets of decisions. First it bias
in the FNMA auction (amounts and rates W, and RW,
, respectively,
it, i_ K, t
-.'here k=l,...,5 and i=l,2). After the auction it makes other commitment,
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delivery, and loan closing decisions. Let x and y denote the vectors
of decision variables chosen in period t before and after the FNMA auction,
respectively-
Let s denote the state of the system at the beginning of period
t as described above. Given s , note that x
, y , and q jointly
determine s _ , the state of the firm at the beginning of period t+1 .
Denote this relationship by s . = g(s ,x ,y ,q ) .
To illustrate the form of the objective function, define the following
quantities.
h(s ,x ) = the expected contribution to the objective function of the
bidding activities in period t
,
given pre-auction state
s and bid decisions x .
Z(s ,x ,y ,q ) = the contribution to the objective function of the post-
auction decisions in period t given pre-auction state s
,
bidding decisions x , information set realization q , and
post-auction decisions y .
f (s ) = the value of the objective function for the optimal policy
from period t onward, given that the firm starts period t
in state s .
The objective of the MBF is to select x and y to solve
(10) f (s ) = " { h(s x ) + I P(qJ{ Z(s ,x ,y ,q )
t ,y t qt
in Q
+ aiW g(st'W qt )]}} •
Equation (10) contains the cash flows resulting from the firm's decisions
in period t : CF
t
( s
t
»
x
t
>y
t
) = h(s
t>
x
t
) + I P(q
t
)Z(s
t
,x
t ,y^ ,qt
) .
qt
In terms of the variables defined earlier, these cash flows are:
(.11) CF(s ,x ,yj = -(1-TX) E E BC* W*
t t t
i=1 k=1
k,t n,t
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2 5
2 5 M
S ?(qj t -(l-TX) E [ I Z CC* . C* fq .RW,1 )
in Q
C 1-1 k-1 m-t+1
1
'
k
'
m
'
t
'
k
'
m
'
t V k)t
qt
' 3 K . M
+ E E J E CC
1
,
C. . fq ) ]
j-2 k-1 m=t+l J ^' m ' t J 'k 'm ' t "
+ I j! [ Aj ft (qt ) + B.J it (q c ) - (l-TX)OcJ ft (qt ) " 1 1 vj^)
2 L t — 1- ..
e r
i-l 1-1 n-l
+ [1 - ~(l-TX)RB
t
(qt
)][B
t
(qt )
- B^Cq^)]
2 3 K L M t-1 t-1+EEE J EEEE[1- (l-TX)DC. .
i-l j-1 k-1 1=1 m-t P=0 c=0
j,k,*.,m,p,t
- (l-TX)DP*
,
.
(RC^ . (q ),RV* (q ))]X* .
, (q )j,k,2,m,p,c,t v 3,k,m,p. Mp l,c H c J ,k,£,m,p,c,t VM t'
The first term in equation (11) represents the bidding costs from
participation in the FNMA auctions in period t . The first two terras
inside the braces are the costs of the commitments acquired in period t .
The next expression combines servicing revenue, float (including escrow
9balances), origination costs, and the outlay of principal on new loans
made in period t . The following three terms encompass the warehousing
9
Ideally, the tormulation snould also capture the difrerential impacts
that Loan delivery has upon estimated float cash flows. Servicing agreement:
vary among secondary market purcnasers as to when mortgage oayments are
forwarded. Estimated float cash flows should ideally be adjusted according
to ~hich placement alternative is utilized.
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cash flows and express, respectively, interest income en new loans, interest
income on loans already in the portfolio, and funds generated or lost through
the change in the firm's debt level, net of the associated interest cost.^
The balance of the equation represents tin iiu;rkrting ca.s'.i flows— thuse
generated by exercisinc commitments and selling loans—net of delivery
charges and discount points paid, if any.
By considering only chose elements of (11) that contribute to
the profit or loss shown on the MBF income statement, a similar
expression exists for the firm's income, Y (s ,x ,y ,q ). (In
the equation below, the figure .00375, representing an average annual ser-
vicing income per dollar face amount of loans, was obtained through
interviews with mortgage bankers.)
(12) vvvvV = (1~TX) { -\ A<X, ti=l k=l
2 5 M
E [ I E CC!. C,
, „(q .RW.
1 J
i-1 k=l m»t+l
1
'
k
'
m
'
t 1
'
k
'
m
'
t V k,t
3 K M
+ Z Z 2 Z CC
1
,
C , (q )]
J-2 k=l m=t+l j
'
k
'
m
'
C ] 'k 'm ' t C
, 2 L t-1 .
.
2 L .
+ -ti E Z U. RV* (q ) + ^r I Z V* (q )?.V* (q )26
i=l £=1 a-0
£
'
n
'
t-1 l > a V 26i=l £-1 l ' t V *' C V
2 3 K. L M t-1 t-1
E E EJ E I E E [D?l
,
„
(RC 1 , Cq VRV 1 (q ))
i= l j= i k=i Z = l m=t p=0 c=0 J. k ^^'P.c,t Jsk,m,p
4
p ; t.c
l
c
+ DCLk,^m ,p jt ] " I6*VV [W ' Bt -l (Vl)] }
This formulation presumes the warehousing period to be short enou^.
to justify the use of face anounts in the computation of warehousing income.
In other words, the amount of principal reduction during the warehousing
period is negligible. This seems realistic in light of current mortgage
banking practice where a typical warehousing period is 60 days. The^fration
(1/26) translates annual rates into those appropriate to a two-week period.
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Equation (12) is useful In projecting the capital structure of the
firm at the end of period t . The expected profit from a particular
strategy (x ,y ) can be wricten E [Y } . where the eypectat ion in
t t x ,v t
'
t t
taken with respect to t'.e possible values of c. . Given EQ (q )
•t t-1 ( t-l '
the equity position of the firm at the end of period t-1
, the expected
equity position one period later is E[EQ ] = EQ (q ) + E fy 1
t t-1 t-1 x
t-'? fc
'
if
^
x
t
,y
t^
are cnosen in period t and dividends are ignored.
The Constraint Set
When performing the maximization (10), the MBF finds itself
subject to several constraints. In addition to the nonnegativity
restrictions noted earlier, the firm must satisfy a number of
legal and economic requirements. In particular, the MBF maximizes
(10) subject to the following conditions.
(13)
"Ut.p.t
- H ^.k.t.t.p.e.tV • "««.2. k-1 K2 ,
p=0,. .
.
,t-l
L t
i 3 K. M t .(i4) E Z U
£ n t "
Z EJ E S H
- v , < CL
1
,
for 1-1,2
(15) vi,t (qt } - D 5, t (q t } for i=i ' 2 ' £=i '---' l
(16) EQ (q ) + E [YJ > ELt-1 t-1 x
t
,y
t
t
2 L t .
(17)CA+ Z S E U* - EQ (q ) - E [Y] < BL
i=l £ = 1 n=0 lt 'n ' C t 1 t i x t ,/ t t
Equations (1?) force the firm to deliver loans against expiring
mandatory purchase commitments. The inequalities (14) ensure that at
the end of each period, ail the loans in the firm's portfolio are covered
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by valid commitments, at least to willu'n some acceptable tolerance CL .
Line (15) notes that loan originations cannot exceed demand. The equitv
constraint (16) holds that the firm's expected income in period t must
be sufficient to preserve stockholders' equity in an amount at least as
large as the minimum acceptable, EL . Finally, (17) limits the amount
of debt the firm can incur. The firm's balance sheet assets consist of
cash and loans. The difference between total assets and the expected equity
is the expected borrowing requirement, which must not exceed BL .
Analysis and Solution
Unfortunately, no solution to the model presented in (10) through
(17) is readily at hand. The solution technique normally applied to sequen-
tial decision problems, such as (10), is dynamic programming. However,
solution of a model such as the one offered here—with its multiple decisic
within each period; large numbers of decision variables, dimensions, and
random variables; intricate structure; and complex constraint set— is
far beyond the present state of the art. What the model formulated above
does provide is a general statement of the mortgage palcement problem with an
explanation cf the relationships .-.rnong the different aspects of the prodec:
in analytical terms. It offers a conceptual framework from which smaller,
more tractable models can be constructed to focus on particular subproblers.
The balance of this paper describes and analyzes one such model. ^i
.ons
Another promising alternative is to revise the state and transition
definitions so as to conform to the conditions of Sobel's theorem
which provides conditions under which the myopic solution to a dynamic
problem is optimal. Unfortunately, large amounts of computer time are
required to solve the resulting multivariable nonlinear problem in multici^nsi--^
space.
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THE REDUCED M"1)KI.
The first decision the MBF faces each period is how to bid in
the upcoming FNMA auction. This decision is the focus of the model
analyzed below. The other decisions
—
purchase of other commitments, loan
closings, and loan delivery—are assumed to be made in accordance with
some exogenously specified policy rule. (Of course, the effects of different
policy rules on bidding decisions and cash flows can be tested by rerunning
the model.)
The model presented below is essentially a reduced version of (10)
Through (17) . The reduction occurs by making a number of simplifying
assumptions that render the model more tractable without eliminating
essential characteristics of the problem.
The model only considers FiiA/VA loans. t\ typi.-.al MBF conducts the
majority of its business in this area. Moreover, until the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation auctions become fully open to mortgage bankers,
and until the privately-guaranteed pass-through gains a wider acceptance
among investors, FIIA/VA loans will continue to command the lion's share
of the MBF's attention.
All FHA/VA loans are assumed to be homogeneous with respect to all
characteristics except interest rate and dollar face amount. Given the
borrower/lender/propcrty requirements of the FHA and the VA, this is not
a very severe assumption.
The MBF may purchase two kinds of commitments, four-month optional
commitments through the FNMA auction or four-month optional commitments
through private negotiation. The typical MBF peaces most of its FHA.'YA
1 jloans through the FNMA. Nil other commitment devices can reasonabiv
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For conventional loans, high quality paper can often be marketed
privately at a lover yield than through the F'.'MA. (This is consistent with
the FNMA charter which provides chit the FNMA's role should be supplemental
and not dominant in the market.) Consequently, mortgage banking subsidiaries
id
be condensed into one because (a) the net servicing revenue— the largest
profit item— is similar across all other FHA/VA loan placements, (b) com-
mitment costs are in the same range, and (c) yield differentials typically
are small.
Warehousing and float considerations are ignored. Warehousing issues
interact most directly with the delivery decision and float rebates to dif-
ferent remittance policies among the different commitment alternatives.
Hence, the firm may reasonably be assumed to take these factors inco account
in establishing the policy rule for the other decisions.
Three additional assumptions make the model far easier to manipulate
a^d analyze. First, the cash and equity positions of the firm are both
assumed to be constant. These components of the typical MBF's balance
sheet are relatively fixed- a large protion of profits are paid
out and bank lines remain fairly stable over the relevant time
horizon. Second, tax considerations are ignored. Their inclusion is a
straightforward extension of the model, but would complicate matters unneces-
sarily at this juncture. Third, the discount factor is assumed to be a
constant. Since one period in the model represents two weeks, the firm's
discount rate should not be expected to change much from period to period.
In each period, the policy rule must specify (a) how many loans to
close, (b) which commitments to exercise, (c) which loans to deliver against
exercised commitments, and (d) how much additional new commitment coverage
to purchase. For the purposes of tl s paper, new originations are assumed
to equal demand (an exogenous random variable). Commitments are fi-st exerc.sed
in an amount sufficient to maintain the loan portfolio at or below the firm's
cr-i.iit
_:nir, with expiring commitments being exercised first. Because
origination volume and i.oan turnover are so important, further deliveries
are assumed to be made to the extent that the firm can profitably make t'.iera.
Loans are delivered from the portfolio on a weighted-average interest rate
basis. Finally, the firm's "good" commitment coverage is computed and addi-
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of the portfolio at or below a pre-determined .maximum. (A "good" commitment
is one whose interest rate is less than the current period's loan origination
rate plus some exogenously input tolerance.) This "good coverage" rule
penalizes the MBF if it bids too high in the LrNMA auction. By bidding
high, the firm can achieve a high probability that its bid will be accepted,
but it purchases potentially "bad" coverage as a result.
In the initial period, than, the MBF chooses the amounc and
interest rate to bid in the upcoming FNMA auction. After the results of
the auction become known, the policy rule is invoked to make delivery and
commitment purchase decisions. Profit or loss is calculated, the sta^e
of the firm is updated, and the system advances to the next period. For
decision-making purposes in a given period, it is assumed that the amount
bid in the FNMA auctions in future periods is $15,000,000 (the greatest
total that the FNMA will allow) or the difference between the firm's current
loan position plus expected new demand and its "good" coverage, whichever
is less. Historically, negotiated commitments tend to be more expensive
that those purchased through the FNMA auctions, so mortgage bankers strive
to obtain as much of their coverage needs through the auctions as possible. li
The state of the firm at the beginning of period t, s , is defined
by the union of five sets: (a) the loans on hand, [U : i=l . L
£,n,t-l -->•• -^,
n=Q,...,L-l}
; (b) the interest rates on these loans, {RV (a ): l=\ T
i,n n ' '
(c) the unexpired, unexercised commitments, (H : i^-1 2
j
,n ,t-L J ' '
'..d) the interest rrd's on these commitments, {(RC , RC (q ))
1 ,n' 2 ,n n
and (e) the information history. (q : n=0,...,t-l}
. Thus,
the meanings of the components of s^ in this auction model are analogous
to those of their counterparts in the larger problem.
n=0,...,t-i}
n-0,... ,t-l}
n=C, . .
.
,t-l}
10 , ,
FhlS has oeen crue historically, but at the time of this draft -Ortoher19-9), required GNMA yields are significantly more attract:ive.
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Actions W and RC. h (respectively, the amount and race bid), together
t ^ j ^>
wita the random outcome q , transform s into s as follows.
U
^
2 c -1 t-1
U - U„ , P n,t - E £ E X. „ (s ,W ,RC. ,q )
*,n,t i,n,t-l t-1 o n_n 3i*.P.c,t t t' l,t'V3-1 p-t-8 c-0
i=o
l
»
1
» t
for JL=1,...,L and n=0,...,t-l
and U^
t
= V
z t
(q
t
) for 1=1,..., L.
2 t-1 t-1
H. = C. (q ,RC, ) - I I EX.. „(s -VJ.RC. .qjj,n,t j,n,t vV l,t' l=1 c=Q z=n+1 j,*,p,c,t t t l,t' H t
for j=l,2, n=0, ..
.
,t-l.
These equations—together with the quantities RV (q ) , £=1,...,L; RC (q );
and q —jointly define the function s . - g(s ,W ,RC. ,q ) .
The objective of the firm, then, is to oDtimallv choose W and RC.J ' J
t l,t
to soive
2
f(s
.) = max { -(BC)W + E P(q ) { E CC.C. ,(q,,RC. )
t t . _
n
t
. j j ,t
nt l,t
q
t
in Q j=l
L
+ [A (qj - OC (q )] E V. (q )
t ' 't t
M
t 2.,r.
H
t
2 L t-1 t-1
+ E E E E [DP. . (RC. (q ),RV. (q )) + DC .
]
j=l l-l p=t-8 c=0 J.^P^.t J'P P , a,c c j
' X
,- t n r ,-(
s
r
,W RC
...O + af[g(s W RC _,q )]} } ,J,t,p,c,t t t l,t t t t 1,C t
subject to both a capital constraint
t
I E U. „ < BL
£=1 n=l -'
n
'
f
~
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and a coverage constraint
t-1
E IT
L t-1
n
',n,t 2 t-1
1 [ z h n t " "rr^i s E H, n t r ^ RV f t ^ t ) +T -RC i t (qt))] « CL4=1 n«0 *' '*
J jj, J-l b-0
], , l
'
1 J,
-
l-l n=0
£
'
n
'
C
where x is an exogenously determined interest rate tolerance, and where
I(x) = 1, if x>0 , and I(x) = otherwise.
An Example of the Reduced Model
Given some starting conditions and the policy rules to be followed, the
MB3? can invoke a computer search routine to solve the auction model.
This section presents an illustrative example for the two- and three-
period cases using the policy rules described above.
The example consider." eight cases, based on what are intuitively the
three most sensitive variables. The maximum allowable uncovered position
is alternatively $4,000,000 or $20,000,000. Good commitments are determined
by the current origination rate plus cither .0005 or .0010 (the tolerance
factor). If the firm originates too many loans and violates its capital
constraint even after exercising all its commitments, additional loans must
be sold. To discourage excessive originations, the model assumes such leans
are sold at a loss of either .01 or .05. The eight cases represent
all possible combinations of r.hese three quantities.
In this example, the MBF has a choice of five yields and
s .:< amounts to bid. These yields are presented In Table 1 along with the
probabilities of their acceptance. £he yields and acceptance probabilities
were derived using data from I'NMA auctions during 197 t— 1978 . "irst a
forecast of the low accepted hid io made folloung Miles and Sears.
Then the probabilities of acceptance for bids around -his forecast are
generated usiivi historical frequencies.
The simulation operated as follows. 3efore the KBF makes its bid
decision in period 1, the low accepted bid in the FNMA acution in period
is randomly generated form the distribution described above. This period
yield determines the MBF expectations about all the other yields over the
relevant horizon in accordance with historical relationships and the experience
of the FNMA, the GNMA, and local MBFs . The randomly generated yield also
determines the rates the firm may bid in each period (the decision set).
Thus, each randomly generated, period 0. low accepted bid provides the
input data and decision se: used in the eight cases for both the two- and
three-period horizons. (Limited computer funds precluded consideration o£
more numerous possible actions and more than one set of input data.) The
dynamic programming technique of backwards optimization determines the
appropriate decision for the mortgage banker to Take in period 1.
For a fuller discussion of t'e econometric model supporting these
probabilities, see Miles, Mike E. and Sears, R. Stephen, "An econometric
approach to the Federal National Mortgage Association Free Market System
Auction," Working Paper, ihe University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
School of Business Administration, 1979.
For a discussion of chese historical relationships, see Sears,
od. cit.
A good introduction to dynamic programming is found in Wagner,
Harvey M. , Principles of Operations Research , F.n"lewcod Cliffs: Prentice-
Hail, 1975.
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TABLE 1: BID YIELDS AND ASSOCIATED
1
PROBABILITIES OF ACCEPTANCE
PERIOD YI SLD ACCEPT* .NCE PROBABILITY
1 .10780 .95
1 .10751 .85
1 .10733 .75
1 .10715 .65
1 .10698 .55
2 .10728 .95
2 . 10699 .85
.10681 .75
2 . 10663 .65
2 '. 10646 .55
3 .10735 .95
3 . 10706 .85
3 .10o88 .75
3 .10670 .65
3 .10653 .55
The initial conditions and model parameters are listed in Table 2.
The firm begins with a capital constraint of $8^,000,000 and a loan portfolio
of $80,000,000, of which $72,000,000 is covered by commitments. Its discount
rate is set at 10%.
An analysis of the inputs, in injunction with the random generation
of observations from the historical distributions, reveals that interest
rates firr.t go down in the second period and then rise- slightly in the third
period. An examination of the bid yield inr its und the good commitment
parameters shows that .is the model progresses from period to period, or from
auction to negotiated commitment purchase, not all of the commitments purchased
in prior auctions continue to qualify as good coverage in certain cases.
This captures the principal trade-off of the auction procedure—a higher
bid carries a higher probability of acceptance, but may require purchase
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The $4 million and $20 million limits on uncovered loans respectively
force a tightening and permit a loosening of the firm's commitment position.
The demand and commitment expiration schedules force the firm in periods
2 and 3 to jell off loans after exercising all commitments. Thus, the impact
of the seLling loss percentage can be evaluated.
The results of the two-period model are presented in Table 3, while
those from the three-period version are found in Table 4. Tables 3 and 4
present the parameter values for each case as well as the values of the
decision variables and objective function. The results improve as the res-
trictions on the firm are relaxed
—
greater permissable uncovered loan portfolio,
more generous definition of good coverage, and lower penalty for excessive
loan closings. Other tables, available from the authors, display the con-
ditional portfolio positions of the firm given that the firm ends up in a
specific state at the end cf the model. These tables give the yields and
amounts for the ending loan and commitment portfolios, together with the
final coverage exposure.
From the results it appears, at least for the two-period model, that
relaxing the coverage constraint produces a wider in bid yields
than does tightening the constraint. It would be hazardous , however, to
state this as a firm conclusion without first testing other constraint levels
and input data sets.
For at least two cases—exposure limit or" $20 million, 500a commitment
tolerance of .0010 above the origination race, and both selling discounts
— the yields and amounts in the first two periods of the optimal solution
to the three-period model differ from the optimal solution to the two-period
model. How long an horizon is required before the
fore, remains an open question and one whose solution is a function of a
larger computer bucket.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION'S
This paper has formulated a mathematical mode] of t!ie mortgage loan place-
ment pro 1.) .'en. Although not solvable in itself, given the current state of mathe-
matics, the nouel provides a conceptual framework for further work in the
field. In particular, smaller, more tractable models of sub-problems can
be e- ' ract2d from the larger formulation. The paper provides an example
of such a model, one that analyzes the FNMA free market system auction bid-
ding decision in a reduced form dynamic framework. The computer solution
of thiF auction model is presented for two- and three-period horizons for
a variety of operating parameters and tvpical input data.





